Around 1950, both Gödel and Turing wrote papers for broader audiences.
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Gödel drew in his 1951 dramatic philosophical conclusions from the general formulation of his second incompleteness theorem. These conclusions concerned the nature of mathematics and the human mind. The general formulation of the second theorem was explicitly based on Turing's 1936 reduction of finite procedures to machine computations. Turing gave in his 1954 an understated analysis of finite procedures ("puzzles") in terms of Post production systems ("substitution puzzles"). This analysis, prima facie quite different from that given in 1936, served as the basis for his exposition of various unsolvable problems. Turing had addressed issues of mentality and intelligence in contemporaneous essays, the best known of which is, of course, "Computing machinery and intelligence". Both men were convinced that some mental processes are not mechanical, in the sense that Turing machines cannot mimic them. For Gödel, such processes were to be found in mathematical experience and he was led to the conclusion that mind is separate from matter. Turing simply noted that for a machine or a brain it is not enough to be converted into a universal computing machine in order to become intelligent: "discipline", the characteristic feature of such a machine, has to be supplemented by "initiative", and it is 1 I am referring to Gödel 1951 and Turing 1954 , but also to Gödel 1947 and Turing 1950 2 Gödel 1951 , p. 312, Wang 1974 , pp. 324-6, and Turing 1948 a central scientific task "to discover the nature of this residue as it occurs in man, and to try and copy it in machines". (Turing 1948, p. 125) In this essay I focus on Gödel's multifaceted work concerning the analysis of mechanical procedures, which he seems to have begun sometime around 1950. His considerations rely emphatically on Turing's paper "On computable numbers" and culminate in the enigmatic formulation of the 1964 Postscriptum to his Princeton Lectures where he writes, "Turing's work gives an analysis of the concept 'mechanical procedure'… This concept is shown to be equivalent with that of a 'Turing machine'."
Gödel's analytic work must be seen in contrast with, or as a deepening of, his earlier attempts to explicate effectively calculable functions as general recursive ones. He emphasized this feature of general recursive functions in the strongest possible terms even ten years later, when he made his "Remarks before the Princeton bicentennial conference on problems in mathematics".
Gödel introduced general recursive functions in his Princeton
It is deeply ironic that Gödel, in his 1951 lecture, views the reduction of the concept of finite procedure to that of a finite machine as "the most satisfactory way" to arrive at a precise definition, whereas Turing, in his 1954 essay, does not even mention machines: his analysis is presented purely in terms of combinatorial operations on finite discrete configurations, and his thesis states that all such combinatory processes can be reduced to Post canonical systems. We will explore, how these crisscrossing attempts of characterizing mechanical procedures were motivated and how they unfolded in the two decades from 1934 to 1954. The unfolding in Gödel's case remained incomplete even during the following two decades. After all, Gödel's 1972 charged Turing with having committed a philosophical error in the very work that provided, according to Gödel's judgment in 1964, the basis for "a precise and unquestionably adequate definition of the general notion of formal system".
I. Effective calculability 4
The following is a brief reminder of the reasons why a rigorous mathematical formulation of this informally understood concept was crucial. For Gödel, it was essential to give a general definition of formal system and, thus, to have the means of formulating his incompleteness theorems in full generality for all formal systems (and not just for Principia Mathematica and related systems). Turing was fascinated by Hilbert's decision problem, the Entscheidungsproblem in the title of his 1936 paper, and suspected that it had a negative solution; but to give such a solution Turing had to characterize first the mechanical procedures involved in the very formulation of the problem. Church, finally, wanted to address the logical decision problem, but also more standard mathematical problems, for example in his 1936, "the problem of topology, to find a complete set of calculable invariants of closed three-dimensional simplicial manifolds under homeomorphisms". Thus, we see in the work of these three pioneers the absolute need of having a mathematically precise concept "corresponding" to the informal notion of effective calculation or mechanical procedure. This correspondence has since been articulated as Church's or Turing's Thesis.
In early 1934, Church had proposed, in a conversation with Gödel, to identify effective calculability of number theoretic functions with their λ-definability. More than a year later he reported, in a letter to Kleene, on Gödel's reaction to his proposal: 5 Gödel viewed it as "thoroughly unsatisfactory" and made a counterproposal, namely, "to state a set of axioms which would embody the generally accepted properties of this notion [i.e., Gödel 1934 , is not to be interpreted in that way at all. Gödel wrote to Martin Davis, "… it is not true that footnote 3 is a statement of Church's Thesis. The conjecture stated there only refers to the equivalence of 'finite (computation) procedure' and 'recursive procedure'. However, I
was, at the time of these lectures, not at all convinced that my concept of recursion comprises all possible recursions; …" What Gödel tried to do is to characterize the computations of values of "recursively specified" number theoretic functions by uniform and arithmetically meaningful steps.
Indeed, for Gödel, the crucial point was the specification of systematic rules for carrying out computations or, to put it differently, for deriving equations. That point of view was also expressed by Kleene, who wrote with respect to the definition of general recursive functions that "it consists in specifying the form of equations and the nature of the steps admissible in the computations of the values, and in requiring that for each given set of arguments the computation yield a unique number as value". (Kleene 1936, p. 727) In a letter to van Heijenoort, dated 14 August 1964, Gödel asserted, "it was exactly by specifying the rules of computation that a mathematically workable and fruitful concept was obtained". The formulation of the equational calculus with purely formal, mechanical rules brought out clearly what Herbrand, according to Gödel, had failed to see, namely, "that the computation (for all computable functions) proceeds by exactly the same rules".
Church defended the identification of effective calculability with general recursiveness in his 1935 and tried to prove that every effectively calculable function is general recursive in Church 1936. By then, Church had significant additional information with which to support his proposal, namely, i) the quasi-empirical work of Kleene and Rosser showing that all known effectively calculable functions are indeed λ-definable, and ii) the mathematical equivalence of λ-definability with general recursiveness (but later also with µ-recursiveness that had been introduced in Kleene 1936 ). Church's attempt to prove that every effectively calculable function is general recursive was, however, semi-circular in the sense that he assumed without good reason that the necessarily elementary calculation steps have to be recursive. 
II. Absoluteness
The Princeton meeting is of interest not only because of Gödel's contribution, but also because of Tarski's talk that was focused on the decision problem.
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Tarski's choice of the decision problem as the main concern for the conference was motivated, as he put it, historically, materially, and heuristically: historically, as he connected it directly to Hilbert's concerns in 1900; materially, as he thought "that the task of logic is to mechanize thinking"; heuristically, as "many diverse problems can be couched in terms of it". The decision problem raised for Tarski the intuitive question, is there "a mechanical means of deciding whether any given statement of a formal system is a theorem". It appeared to him that "the precise instrument for treating the decision problem is the Gödel-Herbrand notion of a general recursive function", and he argued that the problem's precise formulation coincides with the mathematical question, whether the set of theorems of a formal theory is recursive. In his argument, Tarski used, as an intermediate step, the unsupported claim that the theorems of any formal system are recursively enumerable, as Church had done in 1936. He admitted that some logicians had doubts as to the adequacy of general recursiveness "to handle the intuitive content of the decision problem", yet he refrained from further remarks, since another speaker was to address the issue. It is likely that he had in mind Kleene or Gödel. As we will see, Gödel did refer to Tarski's talk and asserted that the absoluteness of general recursiveness makes that notion so significant. In 1936, Gödel had already made an absoluteness claim for higher type extensions of number theory in the Postscriptum to his brief note "On the length of proofs"; the system S 1 is classical arithmetic, whereas for i>1 the S i are the systems of arithmetic of order i. Here is the claim:
It can, moreover, be shown that a function computable in one of the systems Si, or even in a system of transfinite order, is computable already in S1. Thus the notion 'computable' is in a certain sense 'absolute', while almost all metamathematical notions otherwise known (for example, provable, definable, and so on) quite essentially depend upon the system adopted. (Collected Works I, p. 399) Ten years later Gödel reemphasized absoluteness, understood in a more general way. In his contribution to the Princeton meeting, he considers not just higher type extensions of arithmetic, but any formal theory that contains arithmetic. In a footnote added in 1965, Gödel makes that broadened absoluteness claim explicit:
To be more precise: a function is computable in any formal system containing arithmetic if and only if it is computable in arithmetic, where a function f is called computable in S if there is in S a computable term representing f. (Collected Works II, p. 150) In both formulations we have a clear meta-mathematical claim. As the earlier one pertains to particular, concretely presented formal theories, the step-by-step argument succeeds directly. The critical question is, of course, how the later claim can be proved, i.e., the assertion that functions computable in any formal system (containing arithmetic) are general recursive. Obviously, one has to exploit in some way the formal character of the system, for example, by making the assumption of Church or by imposing the recursiveness conditions of Hilbert & Bernays. Either way of proceeding reveals the relative character of Gödel's absoluteness. This is particularly damaging to Gödel's primary motivation for obtaining a rigorous notion of effective calculability: after all, a characterization of "formal" theories was needed for the general formulation of his incompleteness theorems, but here he presupposes a mathematically sharpened concept of such theories.
It is important to note that Church and Gödel at this point had very similar methodological views. Church's perspective on "absoluteness" comes out, for example, have to be of a very complicated, not general recursive, sort and should raise concerns about its effective applicability. In sum, the assumption that f is effectively calculable, but not recursive, would force its computability in a theory that is no longer recursively presentable. This is a fittingly coherent perspective and parallels Gödel's.
The efforts of explicating effective calculability via computability in appropriate calculi and establishing absoluteness claims do not overcome the stumbling block for a general analysis, i.e., they do not provide a systematic reason for insisting that the elementary steps in computations have to be recursive. As we will see, only Turing's work addresses this stumbling block directly. At the Princeton meeting Gödel mentioned Turing's notion of machine computability; however, it is only mentioned alongside general recursiveness without any emphasis that this notion might have a special role.
Gödel starts his lecture with, "Tarski has stressed in his lecture (and I think justly) the great importance of the concept of general recursiveness (or Turing's computability)." He continues, It seems to me that this importance is largely due to the fact that with this concept one has for the first time succeeded in giving an absolute definition of an interesting epistemological notion, i.e., one not depending on the formalism chosen. (Collected Works II, p.150) The philosophical significance of the notion is thus formulated in terms of its absolute definition, which makes it independent from particular formalisms. It is not pointed out, however, that the correctness of the absoluteness claim depends on the fact that one is dealing with appropriately restricted formalisms.
Only in the Gibbs Lecture does Turing's computability become publicly a focal point for Gödel's attempt to characterize effective calculability. There he explores the implications of the incompleteness theorems, not in their original formulation, but rather in a "much more satisfactory form" that is "due to the work of various mathematicians".
He stresses, "The greatest improvement was made possible through the precise definition of the concept of finite procedure, which plays such a decisive role in these results." In a footnote he explains what he understands by a "finite procedure" and points to the equivalent concept of a "computable function of integers", i.e., a function f "whose definition makes it possible actually to compute f(n) for each integer n". There are, as a matter of fact, different ways of arriving at such a precise definition, which all lead to exactly the same concept. However, and here is the brief substantive remark on Turing, "The most satisfactory way … [of arriving at such a definition] is that of reducing the concept of finite procedure to that of a machine with a finite number of parts, as has been done by the British mathematician Turing." (Collected Works III, pp. 304-5)
III. Finite machines
Gödel does not expand, in the Gibbs Lecture, on the brief remark just quoted. In particular, he gives no hint of how reduction is to be understood. There is no explanation of why such a reduction is the most satisfactory way of getting to a precise definition or, for that matter, of why the concept of a machine with a finite number of parts is equivalent to that of a Turing machine.
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At this point, it seems, the ultimate justification lies in the pure fact that finite procedures can be "reduced" to computations of finite machines. It is most interesting to note that Gödel already elucidated in his 1933, as others had done before him, the mechanical feature of effective calculations by pointing to the possibility that machines carry them out. When insisting that the inference rules of precisely described proof methods have to be "purely formal", he explains:
[The inference rules] refer only to the outward structure of the formulas, not to their meaning, so that they could be applied by someone who knew nothing about mathematics, or by a machine. This has the consequence that there can never be any doubt as to what cases the rules of inference apply to, and thus the highest possible degree of exactness is obtained. (Collected Works III, p. 45) In the logic lectures Gödel gave at Notre Dame during the spring term of 1939, he discussed Hilbert's logical decision problem in an informal way, after having put it into the historical context of Leibniz's "Calculemus". However, before arguing that results of modern logic prevent the realization of Leibniz's project, Gödel asserts that the rules of logic can be applied in a "purely mechanical" way and that it is therefore possible "to construct a machine which would do the following thing":
The supposed machine is to have a crank and whenever you turn the crank once around the machine would write down a tautology of the calculus of predicates and it would write down every existing tautology … if you turn the crank sufficiently often. So this machine would really replace thinking completely as far as deriving of formulas of the calculus of predicates is concerned. It would be a thinking machine in the literal sense of the word. For the calculus of propositions you can do even more. You could construct a machine in form of a typewriter such that if you type down a formula of the calculus of propositions then the machine would ring a bell [if the formula is a tautology] and if it is not it would not. You could do the same thing for the calculus of monadic predicates.
Having formulated these positive results, Gödel asserts, "it is impossible to construct a machine which would do the same thing for the whole calculus of predicates", and continues:
So here already one can prove that Leibnitzens [sic!] program of the "calculemus" cannot be carried through, i.e. one knows that the human mind will never be able to be replaced by a machine already for this comparatively simple question to decide whether a formula is a tautology or not.
I mention these matters only to indicate the fascination Gödel had with the concrete mechanical realization of logical procedures (and his penchant for overly dramatic formulations).
The manuscript 193? was a draft of a lecture Gödel never delivered, and its content may have been alluded to by Tarski in his Princeton talk. Gödel examines there general recursiveness and Turing computability in great detail, with a methodological perspective that seems to be different from that of the Gibbs Lecture. He gives first, on pp. 167-8, a perspicuous presentation of the equational calculus and claims outright that it provides "the correct definition of a computable function". Then he asserts, "That this really is the correct definition of mechanical computability was established beyond any doubt by Turing." How did Turing establish that fact? Here is Gödel's answer:
He [Turing] has shown that the computable functions defined in this way [via the equational calculus] are exactly those for which you can construct a machine with a finite number of parts which will do the following thing. If you write down any number n1, … nr on a slip of paper and put the slip of paper into the machine and turn the crank, then after a finite number of turns the machine will stop and the value of the function for the argument n1, … nr will be printed on the paper. (Collected Works III, p. 168) The implicit claim is obviously that all mechanical procedures must be executable by machines with a finite number of parts. As above, we can raise the question, why should such machines be Turing machines?
Gödel does not answer this question; but that is not the crucial issue at this point.
Rather, we should be concerned with the structure of the argument for the claim, "That this really is the correct definition of mechanical computability was established beyond any doubt by Turing." A literal reading amounts to this: the characterization of the computations of number theoretic functions via the equational calculus is taken by Gödel to provide "the correct definition of computable function". That the class of computable functions is co-extensional with that of mechanically computable ones is then guaranteed by (what Gödel calls) Turing's proof of the equivalence of general recursiveness and Turing computability.
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As there is no reason given for the first step in this argument, it really is to be viewed as a direct appeal to Church's Thesis. The second important step is justified by "Turing's proof".
If we go beyond the literal reading and think of the argument in terms of Turing's actual analysis (described in greater detail in the next section), then we could arrive at these parallel interpretations: i) Turing starts out in his 1936 with calculations carried out by a (human) computer and argues that they can be taken to involve only the very elementary processes of a Turing machine that operates on strings of symbols; Gödel, this interpretation would maintain, takes the computations in the equational calculus somehow as "canonical representations" of the computer's calculations. ii) Turing states that the machines that operate on strings are easily seen to be equivalent to machines that operate on individual symbols; Gödel appeals to "Turing's proof" that recursiveness and Turing computability are equivalent. The central analytic claims are hidden in i) and are unargued for in Gödel's case, whereas ii) consists of mathematical proofs in both cases.
I cannot see at all, how Turing's reductive steps can be adapted to argue for Gödel's analytic claim. After all, Turing shifts from arithmetically meaningful steps to symbolic processes, which underlie them and satisfy very restrictive finiteness or boundedness conditions. These conditions cannot be imposed on arithmetic steps and are not satisfied by computations in the equational calculus. I will come back to these issues below.
10 In Turing's 1936 general recursive functions are not mentioned. Turing established in an Appendix to his paper the equivalence of his notion with λ-definability. As Church and Kleene had already proved the equivalence of λ-definability and general recursiveness, "Turing's Theorem" is established.
Notice that in Gödel's way of thinking about matters at this juncture, the mathematical theorem stating the equivalence of Turing computability and general recursiveness plays a pivotal role. Church in his 1937 review of Turing's paper sees the situation in a quite different light; he asserts that Turing computability has the advantage over general recursiveness and λ-definability of "making the identification with effectiveness in the ordinary (not explicitly defined) sense evident immediately -i.e. without the necessity of proving preliminary theorems". Church's more detailed argument starts out as follows:
The author [Turing] proposes as a criterion that an infinite sequence of digits 0 and 1 be "computable" that it shall be possible to devise a computing machine, occupying a finite space and with working parts of finite size, which will write down the sequence to any desired number of terms if allowed to run for a sufficiently long time. As a matter of convenience, certain further restrictions are imposed on the character of the machine, but these are of such a nature as obviously to cause no loss of generality -in particular, a human calculator, provided with pencil and paper and explicit instructions, can be regarded as a kind of Turing machine.
Church then draws the conclusion, "It is thus immediately clear that computability, so defined, can be identified with … the notion of effectiveness as it appears in certain mathematical problems …" These are fascinating considerations, but put the cart before the horse or, rather, reverse the direction of Turing's analysis. Informal calculations are simply identified with computations of finite machines that have a finite number of working parts. Those machines, Church claims, are up to convenient restrictions really Turing machines. As a human calculator can be regarded as a Turing machine, Turing computability can consequently be identified with effectiveness.
In a deep sense, neither Church nor Gödel recognized the genuinely distinctive character of Turing's analysis, i.e., the move from arithmetically motivated calculations to general symbolic processes that underlie them and have to be carried out programmatically by human beings: the Entscheidungsproblem had to be solved by us in a mechanical way; it was the normative demand of radical intersubjectivity between humans that motivated the step from axiomatic to formal systems. It is, for this reason, that Turing brings in human computers in a crucial way and exploits the limitations of their "processing capacities", when proceeding mechanically.
IV. Mechanical computors
Turing's work on computability is considered further in other writings of Gödel, or perhaps it would be better to say that the work appears as a topic of aphoristic remarks. In consequence of later advances, in particular of the fact that due to A.M. Turing's work a precise and unquestionably adequate definition of the general notion of formal system can now be given, a completely general version of Theorems VI and XI is now possible. That is, it can be proved rigorously that in every consistent formal system that contains a certain amount of finitary number theory there exist undecidable arithmetic propositions and that, moreover, the consistency of any such system cannot be proved in the system. (Collected Works I, p. 195) In the more extended Postscriptum written for the 1934 Princeton Lectures (and dated 3 June 1964), Gödel repeats the above remark almost literally, but then seems to state a good reason, why Turing's work provides the basis for a "precise and unquestionably adequate definition of the general concept of formal system":
Turing's work gives an analysis of the concept of "mechanical procedure" (alias "algorithm" or "computation procedure" or "finite combinatorial procedure"). This concept is shown to be equivalent with that of a "Turing machine".
In a footnote attached to this sentence, Gödel refers to Turing's 1936 paper and points to the section in which Turing's general discussion of the adequacy of his machine concept is presented. (This is section 9, entitled "The extent of the computable numbers".) 12 Gödel emphasizes in this footnote that "previous equivalent definitions of computability", including general recursiveness and λ-definability, "are much less suitable for our purposes". There is, it seems, no further elucidation by Gödel of the special character of Turing computability in this analytic context. That is unfortunate, as one would like to know how the analysis proceeds and how the (analyzed) concept is shown to be equivalent to Turing computability. We could go back to the parallel interpretations of 193? and see whether they provide a key to addressing the problems. If, as Turing allows in 1954, computors are operating on all kinds of finite discrete configurations, then I locate a deeply problematic appeal to intuition at the precise point, where one has to claim that the operations of computors satisfying boundedness and locality conditions can be carried out by "string machines".
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I consider 15 The term is put in quotation marks, as machines operating on strings can be replaced here by machines operating on more general configurations; cf. my paper with Byrnes, where we consider K-graph machines. Without giving a rigorous answer here, some well-motivated ideas can be formulated for computors: (i) they operate on finite configurations; (ii) they recognize immediately a bounded number of different patterns (in these configurations); (iii) they operate locally on these patterns; (iv) they assemble, from the original configuration and the result of the local operation, the next configuration. By exploiting these general ideas, one can attack the problem with a familiar tool, the axiomatic method. It is possible to characterize axiomatically a "Turing Computor" as a special discrete dynamical system and to show that any system satisfying the axioms is computationally equivalent to a Turing machine. (Cf. Sieg 2002.) No appeal to a thesis or central thesis is needed; rather, that appeal has been replaced by the standard and non-trivial task of recognizing the correctness of axioms for an intended notion. Here is, I would argue, the proper locus of an appeal to intuition, as it is in the case of any mathematical theory that is to capture aspects of our intellectual or physical experience.
Gödel claims in the Gibbs lecture (p. 311) that the state of philosophy "in our days" is to be faulted for not being able to draw, in a mathematically rigorous way, the philosophical implications of the "mathematical aspect of the situation". I have argued implicitly that not even the "mathematical aspect of the situation" had been clarified in a convincing way. Gödel admits in the 1946 Princeton lecture (p. 152) that certain aspects of the concept of definability "would involve some extramathematical element concerning the psychology of the being who deals with mathematics". That is exactly what Turing recognized and exploited for effective calculability, in order to arrive at his analysis of mechanical procedure.
